Platform · 2026
azure-landing-zone-terraform
An opinionated, CAF-aligned Azure landing zone in small Terraform modules: management groups and policy, hub-spoke connectivity, subscription vending and a private AKS spoke, with policy-as-code checks in CI.
- 8
- composable Terraform modules
- 72
- variable validation rules
- 4
- CI jobs: fmt, validate, tflint, checkov
- 0
- pipeline secrets (OIDC only)
The problem
Every enterprise Azure platform I have built needed the same skeleton: a management-group hierarchy with guardrail policy, a hub network that owns egress and DNS, a repeatable way to hand application teams a subscription, and a secure default for Kubernetes. The reference implementations that exist are thorough, but they are large enough that a team adopting them often cannot say what half the code does.
I wanted the same patterns in modules small enough to read in one sitting, with every name, ID and address a placeholder so the repo can be public.
How it works
Two example stacks, deployed in order.
examples/platform composes four modules:
governancebuilds the hierarchy (root, then Platform with Management, Connectivity and Identity; Landing zones with Corp and Online; Sandbox; Decommissioned) and assigns built-in policies: allowed locations, required and inherited resource-group tags, and no public IPs on NICs.managementcreates the central Log Analytics workspace, an optional Automation account, and a diagnostic-settings helper.connectivitybuilds the hub VNet, Azure Firewall with a DNS proxy and an AKS egress rule collection, Bastion, central private DNS zones and the hub side of peering.identitycreates a user-assigned identity with federated credentials for GitHub Actions OIDC, plus RBAC.
examples/landing-zone-aks runs once per application. It takes the platform outputs (hub VNet ID, firewall IP, private DNS zone ID, workspace ID) as inputs and composes:
lz-vending: optional subscription alias and management-group placement, resource groups, a spoke VNet with NSGs, a route table sending0.0.0.0/0to the firewall, peering in both directions, a subscription spend alert, and app-team RBAC.aks-spoke: a private cluster with CNI Overlay and Cilium, user-defined-route egress through the firewall, local accounts disabled, workload identity, the Azure Policy add-on, Container Insights and control-plane diagnostics includingkube-audit-admin.
naming and tagging give every module the CAF naming convention and the mandatory tag set.
Engineering decisions
Hub-spoke rather than Virtual WAN. It gives explicit control over firewall, DNS and routing, costs less for a handful of regions, and is easier to reason about. Virtual WAN is on the roadmap for large multi-region estates.
Vending as code. A landing zone is a reviewed pull request. The guardrails (no Owner for app teams, a default route to the firewall, a spend alert) are code paths, not checklist items a human might skip.
Two providers for peering. lz-vending declares an azurerm.hub provider alias, so the spoke stack can create both sides of the peering without ever being given Contributor on the hub.
Overlay networking for AKS. Pods do not consume VNet addresses, so spokes stay /22-sized and IP planning stays sane across many landing zones.
Built-in policies first. Built-in definitions need no maintenance. Custom ones are only worth it when nothing built in fits.
Fail at plan, not apply. There are 72 validation blocks across the module variables, covering CIDRs, SKUs, reserved subnet names and privileged roles. App-team role assignments reject Owner, User Access Administrator and RBAC Administrator outright. A half-applied landing zone is far more expensive to clean up than a failed plan.
No secrets anywhere. CI authenticates with OIDC federated credentials, and remote state uses Entra ID auth with shared keys disabled.
Results & evidence
- 8 modules and 2 example stacks, roughly 3,000 lines of HCL, each module with its own README.
- CI on every push and pull request:
terraform fmt -check -recursive,init -backend=falseplusvalidatefor each example, TFLint with the azurerm ruleset, and a Checkov policy-as-code scan with results in the job summary. - A commented
planjob shows the exactazure/loginOIDC wiring for connecting the repo to a real tenant. - The security baseline is visible in code: private API server, no NIC public IPs by policy, Bastion-only admin access, firewall threat intelligence set to Deny, and central diagnostics for the firewall, hub and AKS control plane.
The patterns come from enterprise platforms I have built; this repository distils them with placeholder values, and its CI validates the code without connecting to a tenant.
Limitations & next steps
- No module tests. Validation is static (fmt, validate, lint, Checkov). Terratest or
terraform testsuites are the most important gap. - Checkov is soft-fail, so findings are reported rather than blocking.
- Single connectivity model. No Virtual WAN option yet.
- Security tooling stops at the platform layer. Defender for Cloud plans, a Sentinel workspace option and an AKS policy initiative (pod security baseline, allowed registries) are on the roadmap.
- Next: an option to swap modules for Azure Verified Modules where they fit.